Phi — disclosed vulnerability reports and payouts
Every publicly disclosed and closed bug bounty report we hold for Phi, with our own summary of each finding and a link to the original disclosure.
- Reports indexed
- 15
- Total paid
- $0
- Critical
- 0
- Largest payout
- $0
This page collects the 15 closed, publicly disclosed Phi reports indexed on CoinBuggie. Nothing here is active or unpatched — every entry was published by the programme or the researcher after remediation.
The findings concentrate in Logic error, Access control, Front-running / MEV, Reentrancy, across EVM-Solidity, Move. Reading a single protocol end to end is the fastest way to see which assumptions its codebase repeatedly gets wrong, which is usually a better predictor of where the next finding lives than the category alone.
Use the vulnerability class links below to compare these findings against the same bug class in other protocols.
What reviewers look for
- Logic error findings disclosed against Phi
- Access control findings disclosed against Phi
- Front-running / MEV findings disclosed against Phi
- Reentrancy findings disclosed against Phi
Curated highlights
The largest disclosed payouts in this group, with our own summary of each. Every report links back to the original disclosure.
Phi: Refunds sent to incorrect addresses in certain cases
The Phi protocol contains a logic error in its refund mechanism that can cause excess Ether sent during a claim process to be directed to the wrong address. The internal _processClaim function mistakenly uses _msgSender() to identify the recipient of refunds, failing to account for scenarios where the claim is initiated via an intermediate contract. This results in excess funds being trapped in the art contract or diverted to unintended participants instead of being returned to the original user.
Phi: PhiNFT1155 contracts continue sending fees/royalties to old protocol destination address
The Phi protocol suffers from a configuration flaw where child contracts created by the PhiFactory rely on a static, initialization-time address for fee and royalty distribution. Because these child contracts store the protocolFeeDestination locally and do not dynamically fetch it from the factory, any updates to the master address in the PhiFactory are ignored by existing contracts. This prevents the protocol from effectively migrating fee destinations in response to security incidents, such as a compromised address, and leads to ongoing financial loss by routing funds to obsolete or potentially malicious recipients.
Phi: Exposed `_removeCredIdPerAddress` & `_addCredIdPerAddress` allows anyone to cause issues to current holders as well as upcoming ones
The Phi protocol mistakenly exposed critical state-management functions publicly, failing to implement any access control. This oversight allowed any user to modify, add, or delete cred-related data for other addresses, leading to internal data corruption. Consequently, attackers could perform gas-griefing attacks or render core protocol features, such as buying and selling cred shares, completely unusable for targeted victims.
Phi: Lack of data validation when users are claiming their art allows malicious user to bypass signature/merkle hash to provide unapproved `ref_`, `artId_` and `imageURI`
The PhiFactory contract fails to cryptographically bind key parameters to the claim validation process, allowing users to inject arbitrary values during art claiming. Specifically, the referral address, art ID, and image URI are not included in the Merkle proof or signature verification logic. This flaw allows malicious actors to divert referral fees to unauthorized addresses and potentially manipulate metadata associated with the minted NFTs.
Phi: Cred creator could cause stuck funds
A parameter update flaw in Phi allows Cred creators to retroactively increase `sellShareRoyalty_` fees up to 50% on active bonding curve shares. Because fee changes take effect immediately without a timelock or delay, existing share holders attempting to exit positions are forced to forfeit up to half their asset value to the creator. This enables creators to lock or siphon capital from users who acquired shares under lower fee expectations.
Phi: `shareBalance` bloating eventually blocks curator rewards distribution
In Phi protocol's `Cred` contract, curator share balances are tracked using an `EnumerableMap`. When a curator sells all of their shares, `_updateCuratorShareBalance` sets their balance to zero instead of removing their address key from the map. As historical trading volume accumulates, the `EnumerableMap` grows indefinitely with zero-balance addresses. During reward distribution, iterating through all stored map keys consumes excessive gas via repeated `SLOAD` operations. Once roughly 4,000 unique addresses have traded shares of a given cred, the gas required to execute reward distribution exceeds the EVM block gas limit, permanently freezing reward distribution for that cred.
All reports in this group
- Phi: Attacker can DOS user from selling shares of a `credId`Front-running / MEV$0
- Phi: Forced `endTime` extension in `updateArtSettings()` allows attacker to mint more tokensAccess control$0
- Phi: Incorrect fee handling prevents protocol from updating feesAccess control$0
- Phi: Reentrancy in creating Creds allows an attacker to steal all Ether from the Cred contractReentrancy$0
- Phi: Signature replay in `signatureClaim` results in unauthorized claiming of rewardsAccess control$0
- Phi: Signature replay in `createArt` allows to impersonate artist and steal royaltiesReentrancy$0
- Phi: `PhiFactory:claim` potentially causing loss of funds if `mintFee` changed beforehandLogic error$0
- Phi: Unrestricted changes to token settings allow artists to alter critical featuresLogic error$0
- Phi: Contract `PhiNFT1155` can't be pausedReentrancy$0