Ethos Network Financial Contracts — disclosed vulnerability reports and payouts
Every publicly disclosed and closed bug bounty report we hold for Ethos Network Financial Contracts, with our own summary of each finding and a link to the original disclosure.
- Reports indexed
- 6
- Total paid
- $0
- Critical
- 0
- Largest payout
- $0
This page collects the 6 closed, publicly disclosed Ethos Network Financial Contracts reports indexed on CoinBuggie. Nothing here is active or unpatched — every entry was published by the programme or the researcher after remediation.
The findings concentrate in Logic error, Front-running / MEV, across EVM-Solidity. Reading a single protocol end to end is the fastest way to see which assumptions its codebase repeatedly gets wrong, which is usually a better predictor of where the next finding lives than the category alone.
Use the vulnerability class links below to compare these findings against the same bug class in other protocols.
What reviewers look for
- Logic error findings disclosed against Ethos Network Financial Contracts
- Front-running / MEV findings disclosed against Ethos Network Financial Contracts
Curated highlights
The largest disclosed payouts in this group, with our own summary of each. Every report links back to the original disclosure.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: A user can pay less in fees by vouching initially with a smaller amount and then using the `EthosVouch::increaseVouch` function to add the remaining vouch value
Ethos Network's EthosVouch distributes a fraction of each vouch's vouchersPoolFee back to existing vouchers of the same subject. The flaw is that the fee logic treats a brand-new voucher identically to a user topping up via increaseVouch, so a user can vouch a small initial amount to become an existing voucher and then reclaim part of the vouchersPoolFee on every subsequent increase. This lets a user pay materially less in total fees than a single lump-sum vouch, at the expense of prior vouchers who receive less revenue. The finding was adjudicated high and the protocol team fixed it in PR #2242 by excluding the transacting user from receiving vouchersPoolFee during their own call.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: authorProfileId can avoid being slashed
Ethos Network's protocol documentation guarantees that a whistleblower accusation triggers a 24-hour lock on staking and withdrawals for the accused profile, but the EthosVouch.unvouch function never enforces such a lock. By immediately unvouching when accusations appear, a profile can pull its funds out before any slashing executes, so the intended accountability penalty is evaded. This lets well-informed profiles escape punishment and undermines the protocol's trust/slashing mechanism. The finding was acknowledged and fixed by the team via a pauseActions/isActionsPaused guard added to unvouch in PR #2284.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: Missing slippage protection on `sellVotes()`
The Ethos Network ReputationMarket contract offers preview functions (simulateBuy/simulateSell) so users can estimate trade outcomes, but only the buy path enforces slippage protection while sellVotes() does not. This asymmetry means a seller's transaction can fill at a materially worse price than the one previewed if market conditions shift or if a higher-fee competing sale is ordered first by the Base sequencer. Since the executed value is not checked against a user-set minimum, the seller receives less than expected, causing direct financial loss. The protocol team addressed the issue in PR trust-ethos/ethos#2214.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: Market funds cannot be withdrawn because of incorrect calculation of `fundsPaid`
In Ethos Network's ReputationMarket, buying votes routes protocol fees to the treasury and donation fees to the market owner's escrow via applyFees, but the fundsPaid variable used to accumulate marketFunds is never reduced by those fees. This double-counts fees in the market's recorded balance. When a market graduates, withdrawGraduatedMarketFunds attempts to pay out the inflated recorded amount against a smaller actual ETH balance, causing the withdrawal to revert and permanently lock funds — or, if a transfer happens to succeed against pooled ETH, stealing funds that belong to other markets. The protocol confirmed the bug and fixed it in PR trust-ethos/ethos#2216.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: Users could overpay fees when buying votes
In Ethos Network's ReputationMarket, the buy-votes fee calculation applies protocol fees to the user's full submitted `funds` value, while the `_calculateBuy` loop actually spends only a fraction of those funds along the progressively rising vote-price curve. The result is that a user pays a fee on ETH they never spend on votes — in the worked example, nearly double the correct 10% fee. The flaw is economically persistent across repeated buys and market base prices, causing a perpetual overcharge for vote buyers. The protocol team acknowledged and fixed the issue in PR trust-ethos/ethos#2214.
Ethos Network Financial Contracts: Separate calculation of fees in applyFees results in inflated total fee percentage.
The EthosVouch contract's applyFees function computes protocol, donation and vouchers-pool fees through three independent calls to calcFee, each applied against the full pre-fee deposit amount rather than against the amount remaining after the other fees. Because each fee is taken off the original principal, the combined effective charge compounds beyond the intended sum of configured basis points, so users are overcharged. A worked example shows a configured 20% plus 25% fee producing roughly a 57.89% effective charge instead of the intended 45%. The finding was acknowledged at medium severity and the team shipped a fix that consolidates the fee computation into a single combined step.