BendDAO — disclosed vulnerability reports and payouts
Every publicly disclosed and closed bug bounty report we hold for BendDAO, with our own summary of each finding and a link to the original disclosure.
- Reports indexed
- 28
- Total paid
- $0
- Critical
- 0
- Largest payout
- $0
This page collects the 28 closed, publicly disclosed BendDAO reports indexed on CoinBuggie. Nothing here is active or unpatched — every entry was published by the programme or the researcher after remediation.
The findings concentrate in Logic error, Oracle manipulation, Governance attack, Integer overflow / underflow, Reentrancy, across EVM-Solidity. Reading a single protocol end to end is the fastest way to see which assumptions its codebase repeatedly gets wrong, which is usually a better predictor of where the next finding lives than the category alone.
Use the vulnerability class links below to compare these findings against the same bug class in other protocols.
What reviewers look for
- Logic error findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Oracle manipulation findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Governance attack findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Integer overflow / underflow findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Reentrancy findings disclosed against BendDAO
Curated highlights
The largest disclosed payouts in this group, with our own summary of each. Every report links back to the original disclosure.
BendDAO: Incorrect accounting of utilization, supply/borrow rates due to vulnerable implementation in `IsolateLogic::executeIsolateLiquidate`
BendDAO's isolate liquidation process contains an accounting error that incorrectly calculates interest rates. When a loan liquidation involves an extra payment from the liquidator, the protocol mistakenly includes this extra amount when updating pool liquidity parameters. This overstates the total liquidity in the system, which causes the interest rate model to compute inaccurate borrow and supply rates, potentially impacting the financial equilibrium of the lending pool.
BendDAO: It's impossible to retrieve collected fines from the yield staking contract
The YieldStakingBase contract contains an accounting logic error where fines collected from users after forced unstaking events become permanently trapped. While users are required to pay these fines during the repayment process, the contract currently lacks any functionality for administrators to sweep or redistribute these collected assets. Consequently, these fines remain indefinitely locked in the contract, preventing the protocol from effectively realizing the fee revenue intended by the forced unstake mechanism.
BendDAO: Protocol should update interest rate after changing rate model in the configurator module
The BendDAO protocol failed to properly synchronize interest rate accrual after an administrator updated the interest rate model for a specific asset group. This omission meant that interest calculations continued to use outdated parameters until a subsequent user action triggered a state update. While this represented a deviation from expected protocol behavior, the team noted that frequent interactions like borrowing or repaying naturally forced these updates, minimizing the economic impact.
BendDAO: Major insolvency risk in `LiquidationLogic::executeCrossLiquidateERC721()` due to not setting a maximum liquidation price
The BendDAO lending protocol suffers from an insolvency risk during market downturns due to a flawed liquidation pricing mechanism in its cross-liquidation logic. Because the protocol calculates the required repayment by dividing total debt by the number of collateral tokens without applying a maximum price cap, the cost for liquidators to repay the debt can exceed the market value of the underlying NFTs. This makes liquidations unprofitable during periods of high volatility or asset price drops, effectively blocking the system from shedding bad debt and shifting the burden of loss to the DAO treasury.
BendDAO: Bad debt is never handled which places insolvency risks on BendDAO
BendDAO's current lending architecture lacks a formal mechanism for managing bad debt, creating significant solvency risk during market crashes. When the value of collateral falls below the borrowed debt, the protocol's liquidation logic fails to clear the outstanding balance, either because it cannot handle remaining debt after collateral exhaustion or because the liquidation is not economically profitable. This failure effectively traps liquidity within the protocol, preventing depositors from withdrawing their funds and resulting in an indefinite denial of service during insolvency events.
BendDAO: `YieldEthStakingLido` lacks a limit on the max stake amount, which may result in the unstake exceeding `MAX_STETH_WITHDRAWAL_AMOUNT`, resulting in the token not being retrieved
The YieldEthStakingLido contract contains a logic flaw that prevents users from unstaking funds if their staked stETH balance exceeds Lido's 1,000 stETH limit per withdrawal request. Because the contract attempts to process the entire withdrawal amount in a single batch, any position exceeding this limit will cause the transaction to revert. This leads to a denial of service where user funds become locked within the YieldEthStakingLido contract with no mechanism to recover them.
All reports in this group
- BendDAO: `isolateRepay()` lack of check `onBehalf == nftOwner`Integer overflow/underflow$0
- BendDAO: `wrapNativeTokenInWallet()` always reverts on ArbitrumLogic error$0
- BendDAO: `isolateRedeem()` revert in case Revert-on-zero-value-transfers tokensOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: Borrower can prevent yield position repayment and closure by the botLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Mismatch between yield amount deposited in shares calculation and `getAccountYieldBalance()`Integer overflow/underflow$0
- BendDAO: Updating fee factor may create issues for the protocolLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Users cannot unstake from YiedlETHStakingEtherfi.sol, because YieldAccount.sol is incompatible with ether.fi's WithdrawRequestNFT.solLogic error$0
- BendDAO: PriceOracle has invalid checks on price stalenessOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: Unhandled request invalidation by the owner of Etherfi will lead to stuck debtLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Incorrect `unwrapNativeTokenInWallet` receiver addressReentrancy$0
- BendDAO: Updating asset collateral params can lead to liquidate borrowers arbitrarilyOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: `executeYieldBorrowERC20()` checking `yieldCap` is wrongLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Revert due to underflow error, leading to lock of the liquidated NFTInteger overflow/underflow$0
- BendDAO: If an isolated borrower/bidder is blacklisted by the debt token, risk of DOS liquidation/auction of the corresponding loanLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Anyone can get the NFT collateral token after an Auction without bidding due to missing check on `msg.sender`Access control$0
- BendDAO: Risk of mass liquidation after pool/asset pause and unpause, due to borrow interest compounding implementationLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Fee-on-Transfer tokens cause problems in multiple placesLogic error$0
- BendDAO: `erc721DecreaseIsolateSupplyOnLiquidate()` missing clear `lockerAddr`Logic error$0
- BendDAO: User are forced to borrow again in order to unlock their NFTs from `IsolateLending.sol`Logic error$0
- BendDAO: No check if Arbitrum/Optimism L2 sequencer is down in Chainlink feeds `PriceOracle.sol`Oracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: The bot won't be able to unstake or repay risky positions in the yield contractLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Changing auction duration will have effect on ongoing auctionsGovernance attack$0