BendDAO — disclosed vulnerability reports and payouts
Every publicly disclosed and closed bug bounty report we hold for BendDAO, with our own summary of each finding and a link to the original disclosure.
- Reports indexed
- 28
- Total paid
- $0
- Critical
- 0
- Largest payout
- $0
This page collects the 28 closed, publicly disclosed BendDAO reports indexed on Coin Buggie. Nothing here is active or unpatched — every entry was published by the programme or the researcher after remediation.
The findings concentrate in Governance attack, Logic error, Oracle manipulation, Integer overflow / underflow, Reentrancy, across EVM-Solidity. Reading a single protocol end to end is the fastest way to see which assumptions its codebase repeatedly gets wrong, which is usually a better predictor of where the next finding lives than the category alone.
Use the vulnerability class links below to compare these findings against the same bug class in other protocols.
What reviewers look for
- Governance attack findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Logic error findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Oracle manipulation findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Integer overflow / underflow findings disclosed against BendDAO
- Reentrancy findings disclosed against BendDAO
Curated highlights
The largest disclosed payouts in this group, with our own summary of each. Every report links back to the original disclosure.
BendDAO: `YieldEthStakingLido` lacks a limit on the max stake amount, which may result in the unstake exceeding `MAX_STETH_WITHDRAWAL_AMOUNT`, resulting in the token not being retrieved
The YieldEthStakingLido contract contains a logic flaw that prevents users from unstaking funds if their staked stETH balance exceeds Lido's 1,000 stETH limit per withdrawal request. Because the contract attempts to process the entire withdrawal amount in a single batch, any position exceeding this limit will cause the transaction to revert. This leads to a denial of service where user funds become locked within the YieldEthStakingLido contract with no mechanism to recover them.
BendDAO: User are forced to borrow again in order to unlock their NFTs from `IsolateLending.sol`
BendDAO's isolated margin lending protocol suffered from a logic flaw where an NFT collateral could become permanently trapped after a successful redemption during liquidation. When a user fully repaid their debt while their NFT was in an auction state, the protocol failed to clear the asset's locker address or update the loan's status to inactive. This inconsistent state caused subsequent withdrawal attempts to revert, effectively forcing users to take out new loans against the same collateral just to unlock it, thereby exposing their assets to further, unnecessary liquidation risk.
BendDAO: If an isolated borrower/bidder is blacklisted by the debt token, risk of DOS liquidation/auction of the corresponding loan
BendDAO's isolated lending auctions and liquidations are vulnerable to a denial-of-service if a participant (a borrower or bidder) is blacklisted by the debt asset's token contract. When an auction or liquidation flow requires transferring tokens to a blacklisted address, the transfer fails, causing the entire transaction to revert. This effectively freezes the loan's state, preventing further bids or the completion of the liquidation. The issue arises because the protocol assumes all users can successfully receive asset transfers, which is not guaranteed for tokens with administrative blacklist features.
BendDAO: Bad debt is never handled which places insolvency risks on BendDAO
BendDAO's current lending architecture lacks a formal mechanism for managing bad debt, creating significant solvency risk during market crashes. When the value of collateral falls below the borrowed debt, the protocol's liquidation logic fails to clear the outstanding balance, either because it cannot handle remaining debt after collateral exhaustion or because the liquidation is not economically profitable. This failure effectively traps liquidity within the protocol, preventing depositors from withdrawing their funds and resulting in an indefinite denial of service during insolvency events.
BendDAO: The bot won't be able to unstake or repay risky positions in the yield contract
The BendDAO yield staking contract contains a logic error that prevents the `botAdmin` from force-closing risky positions. Because the contract incorrectly uses `msg.sender` to map to yield accounts, administrative attempts to repay or unstake on behalf of borrowers result in an incorrect account lookup. This failure effectively disables critical liquidation functions, posing a high security threat to the protocol's position management capabilities.
BendDAO: Changing auction duration will have effect on ongoing auctions
The protocol incorrectly calculates auction expiration times by dynamically adding a configurable duration parameter to a loan's start timestamp. Consequently, if the protocol administrator updates the auction duration, it retroactively affects all auctions currently in progress. This can lead to unexpected premature auction closures, potentially preventing borrowers from redeeming their debt or causing liquidators to settle auctions earlier than participants anticipated.
All reports in this group
- BendDAO: Incorrect accounting of utilization, supply/borrow rates due to vulnerable implementation in `IsolateLogic::executeIsolateLiquidate`Logic error$0
- BendDAO: Major insolvency risk in `LiquidationLogic::executeCrossLiquidateERC721()` due to not setting a maximum liquidation priceOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: Risk of mass liquidation after pool/asset pause and unpause, due to borrow interest compounding implementationLogic error$0
- BendDAO: It's impossible to retrieve collected fines from the yield staking contractLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Borrower can prevent yield position repayment and closure by the botLogic error$0
- BendDAO: No check if Arbitrum/Optimism L2 sequencer is down in Chainlink feeds `PriceOracle.sol`Oracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: Updating fee factor may create issues for the protocolLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Updating asset collateral params can lead to liquidate borrowers arbitrarilyOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: Revert due to underflow error, leading to lock of the liquidated NFTInteger overflow/underflow$0
- BendDAO: `erc721DecreaseIsolateSupplyOnLiquidate()` missing clear `lockerAddr`Logic error$0
- BendDAO: Incorrect `unwrapNativeTokenInWallet` receiver addressReentrancy$0
- BendDAO: Protocol should update interest rate after changing rate model in the configurator moduleLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Fee-on-Transfer tokens cause problems in multiple placesLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Unhandled request invalidation by the owner of Etherfi will lead to stuck debtLogic error$0
- BendDAO: PriceOracle has invalid checks on price stalenessOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: `isolateRedeem()` revert in case Revert-on-zero-value-transfers tokensOracle manipulation$0
- BendDAO: `executeYieldBorrowERC20()` checking `yieldCap` is wrongLogic error$0
- BendDAO: `wrapNativeTokenInWallet()` always reverts on ArbitrumLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Users cannot unstake from YiedlETHStakingEtherfi.sol, because YieldAccount.sol is incompatible with ether.fi's WithdrawRequestNFT.solLogic error$0
- BendDAO: Anyone can get the NFT collateral token after an Auction without bidding due to missing check on `msg.sender`Access control$0
- BendDAO: `isolateRepay()` lack of check `onBehalf == nftOwner`Integer overflow/underflow$0
- BendDAO: Mismatch between yield amount deposited in shares calculation and `getAccountYieldBalance()`Integer overflow/underflow$0